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Six studies examine the influence of positive affect on self-control in
intertemporal choice (consumers’ willingness to wait for desired rewards)
and the cognitive processes underlying this effect. Two studies measure
participants’ levels of thinking in two different ways, showing that positive
affect can promote forward-looking, high-level thinking. Two studies
using a delay-of-gratification paradigm demonstrate this forward-looking
thinking and show it to be a mindful process. Participants in positive (vs.
neutral) affect were more likely to choose a larger mail-in rebate over a
smaller instant rebate when the reward differences were moderate (but
not when they were small). Two studies demonstrate the impact of
positive affect on intertemporal preference in another way, showing that
participants in positive affect do not discount the value of delayed
outcomes as much as people in neutral affect do (decreased present
bias). Together, the results indicate that positive affect promotes
cognitive flexibility and fosters a higher level of thinking and a more
future-oriented time perspective, without obscuring practical
considerations and other needed detail, including context and
opportunity costs, when evaluating intertemporal options.
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Consumers often face intertemporal choice situations,
which involve timing of receipt of goods or services and
changes in value over time. Some may involve a trade-off
between taking an immediate smaller gain and taking a
delayed larger gain. For example, in some cases, consumers
can get a small amount of money back through an instant
rebate or a larger amount of money back through a mail-in
rebate. Other intertemporal choice situations involve the
tendency for items to lose subjective value if they are
delayed (termed “present bias”). The basic principles under-
lying the effects we study here apply to many kinds of self-
control phenomena, but in this article, we focus primarily
on self-control in intertemporal choices: increase in willing-
ness to wait and reduction of present bias.
Understanding consumers’ preferences for timing of
receipt of products and ways to reduce impulsivity and
increase self-control have been of great interest to many
researchers. According to prior research, the way people
think about an action or an object can increase or decrease
self-control. For example, when people think about an
action at a higher level—that is, in terms of its conse-
quences and implications—their self-control is enhanced
(Fujita et al. 2006; Vallacher and Wegner 1989). In addition,
research has shown that focusing on nonconsummatory
aspects of tempting stimuli (vs. thinking about tempting,
“hot” aspects) can increase delay-of-gratification behavior
in children (e.g., Mischel and Baker 1975; Mischel, Shoda,
and Rodriguez 1989). This stream of research suggests that
self-control can be enhanced through cognitive processes
that involve ways of thinking about the situation and
options.
Recent research on affect has suggested that mild, every-
day positive affect can also enhance self-control. For exam-
ple, researchers have found that people in a positive state
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are more likely to forgo otherwise preferred secondary
interests to accomplish a goal (e.g., Gervey, Igou, and Trope
2005; Isen and Reeve 2005; for discussion, see Isen 2007).
Research using a depletion paradigm (Tice et al. 2007) has
shown that positive affect enhances self-regulation by fos-
tering adoption of an appropriate standard (e.g., Wan and
Sternthal 2008). In addition, research has shown that, when
a goal is relevant to a person, positive affect decreases goal
neglect, the tendency to lose focus on one’s primary goal
(e.g., Kazen and Kuhl 2005). Together, these lines of work
suggest that positive affect can enhance self-control by
increasing people’s ability to monitor and maintain focus on
their chosen goals and standards.
In the consumer domain, research on emotion and self-
control has primarily focused on the role of visceral (“hot”)
factors in impulsive decision making. This literature stream
suggests that viscerally stimulating factors lead people to be
more shortsighted, present oriented, and impatient (e.g., Li
2008; Loewenstein 1996). However, the role of mild positive
affect—which, as noted previously, enhances self-control—
warrants further investigation in the consumer domain.
In the current research, we investigate the influence of
mild positive affect on self-control in intertemporal choice
situations using delay-of-gratification and temporal dis-
counting paradigms that assess change in value with time
delay. In addition, we examine some possible cognitive pro-
cesses that may play a role in such situations. Specifically,
we propose that because people in positive affect are cogni-
tively more flexible, and thus better able to take a more
comprehensive view of the intertemporal choice situation
(i.e., to consider both short- and long-term gains rather than
only immediate gains), they are more willing to wait for a
better reward.
In the following sections, we introduce the concept of
present bias, which bears on the issue of lack of self-control
in intertemporal choice and briefly review the literature per-
tinent to the role of cognitive processes and positive affect
in such self-control problems. Next, we present six studies
testing our hypotheses.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Present Bias: Loss of Self-Control in Intertemporal Choice 
Psychologists and behavioral economists interpret a per-
son’s loss of self-control or impulsive behavior as being
related to a tendency to value immediate rewards over
delayed future rewards (e.g., O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999).
This is known as “present-biased preference” and is also
reflected in hyperbolic discounting (e.g., Frederick, Loewen-
stein, and O’Donoghue 2002). For example, present-biased
preference is evidenced when people do not care for a prod-
uct that will be delivered later as much as for the same prod-
uct delivered immediately, or when people are willing to
pay extra to speed up the delivery of a purchased product.
“Hyperbolic discounting” refers to the rate of decline in
value, or in the amount needed to compensate for a longer
delay compared with a shorter delay, wherein the rate of dis-
counting of the value of the delayed reward is greater for
shorter time horizons (i.e., temporally near) than for longer
time horizons. For example, in one study, people requested
$15 in compensation for a delay of three months in receipt
of a supposedly instant prize but $45 for a delay of one year
(Thaler 1981). That is, their requested monthly compensa-
tion for a short delay was disproportionately greater ($5)
than for a long delay ($3.75). Thus, although the amount of
premium requested increased with a longer proposed delay,
the rate of compensation (the amount for each month of
delay) decreased as the length of the delay time increased.
In short, people tend to discount the value of rewards set to
take place in the future and thus show bias toward the
immediate.
The Role of Cognitive Processes in Self-Control
Prior research has suggested that this present-biased pref-
erences, and, more broadly, self-control problems, are closely
related to the ways people think about the self-control-
requiring situation. In other words, people behave impul-
sively when they are narrowly focused on only an immedi-
ate gain, neglecting the implications that their impulsive
action has for the future. For example, according to action
identification theory (Vallacher and Wegner 1989) and con-
strual-level theory (Fujita et al. 2006), a person thinking
about his or her actions, along with their larger meanings,
motives, and implications (high-level thinking), leads to
engaging in planned behavior, whereas low-level thinking
(not thinking in perspective) leads to responding thought-
lessly only to salient cues in the situation and thus to rela-
tively greater impulsiveness. Consequently, when people
are confronted with a situation in which delay of gratifica-
tion is desirable, thinking of the situation at a high level can
be helpful.
Moreover, specifically with regard to intertemporal choices,
recent studies have shown that a person’s mind-set or level
of construal influences these present-biased preferences. For
example, research has suggested that conceptualizing a sit-
uation at a high level leads to long-term thinking and greater
self-control, and thus to decreased preference for immediate
over delayed outcomes (Fujita et al. 2006). Furthermore,
Malkoc, Zauberman, and Bettman (2007) suggest that a
consumer’s mind-set influences subsequent decision mak-
ing, such that people in abstract mind-sets show a decreased
level of present bias in consumption timing decisions.
In another relevant line of research, Mischel, Shoda, and
Rodriguez (1989) show that the cognitive representation of
tempting rewards underlies self-control processes in pre-
school children. In their experiments, the children who were
led to think about tempting stimuli in nonconsummatory
ways (e.g., thinking about a marshmallow as a puffy cloud,
a white moon) delayed gratification significantly longer
than those who were led to focus on consummatory aspects
of the stimulus (e.g., sweet taste). That is, thinking of a
reward in various ways beyond its tempting aspects can pro-
mote delay of gratification in children. In short, research
suggests that the ability to construe a stimulus or situation
flexibly, in multiple ways, plays an important role in self-
control.
The Influence of Positive Affect on Cognitive Processes
and Self-Control
It is noteworthy that the affect literature suggests that
positive affect has an influence on cognitive processes that
is compatible with what we described in the previous sec-
tion as being conducive to improved self-control—increased
cognitive flexibility, resulting in multiple ways of thinking
about stimuli and situations (Fredrickson and Branigan
2005; Isen 2007; Isen, Daubman, and Nowicki 1987; Isen et
al. 1985; Staw and Barsade 1993). For example, a series of
studies shows that people in positive affect were more likely
than those in neutral affect to categorize nontypical exem-
plars as members of target categories while not losing sight
of the typical ways of categorizing the material (Isen and
Daubman 1984). This is because positive affect fosters the
ability to conceptualize stimuli in multiple ways, and thus
those in positive affect are able to perceive relationships
among seemingly unrelated exemplars. Furthermore,
research has shown that positive affect improves problem
solving (e.g., Erez and Isen 2002; Estrada, Isen, and Young
1997) through this flexible and integrative thinking. This
also would follow from the dopamine hypothesis, which
suggests that positive affect is associated with release of
dopamine into frontal regions of the brain that foster the
ability to consider multiple ideas and perspectives between
them (Ashby, Isen, and Turken 1999).
Regarding self-control, positive affect has been shown to
influence the way people understand immediate and future
rewards. For example, positive affect enables people to per-
ceive more connection between their effort and outcomes,
which increases expectancy motivation and causes more
persistence (Erez and Isen 2002). Similarly, positive affect
helps people recognize a functional relationship between
future outcomes and present situations through flexible
thinking (Aspinwall 1998; Isen 2007; Taylor et al. 1998),
and thus, people in positive affect are able to see how pres-
ent situations are linked to possible future outcomes and
their own effort. Thus, when there is a trade-off between
short-term, immediate rewards and long-term gains, people
in positive affect consider the long term in addition to the
present and are willing to forgo present enjoyment if appro-
priate. For example, in Isen and Reeve’s (2005) studies, par-
ticipants in positive affect showed greater intrinsic motiva-
tion in working on an enjoyable puzzle, but when there was
work to be done, they voluntarily reduced their time on the
puzzle to complete the boring work task. In addition, Gervey,
Igou, and Trope (2005) show that participants in positive
affect were more likely to seek negative feedback than were
those in a neutral state, if that feedback was useful for their
goal (e.g., self-improvement). In summary, positive affect
enhances a person’s self-control by facilitating thinking of
an action or a situation in perspective, along with the con-
text, his or her goals, and implications for the future.
OVERVIEW OF CURRENT STUDIES
On the basis of research showing that positive affect
increases self-control through cognitive flexibility, it is rea-
sonable to expect that positive affect will promote self-control
in the domain of intertemporal choices as well. In the cur-
rent research, we propose that, because positive affect
enables consumers to think flexibly about more aspects of a
situation, including future needs and preferences in addition
to present needs, people in positive affect will be more will-
ing to wait for more desirable later outcomes and will show
decreased present bias.
First, in Studies 1 and 2, we examine the influence of
positive affect on cognitive processes that have been shown
to influence self-control in prior research. Specifically, we
test the possibility that positive affect can foster forward-
looking, high-level thinking, using the Behavior Identifica-
tion Form (BIF; Vallacher and Wegner1989) and the Future
Time Perspective scale (Carstensen and Lang 1996). In
Study 3, we directly test this forward-looking, high-level
thinking using the intertemporal choice paradigm and
examining participants’ choices between an instant rebate
returning a smaller reward and a mail-in rebate returning a
larger reward. In Study 4, we further investigate the nature
of this high-level thinking promoted by positive affect—
specifically, whether it is a heuristic process (e.g., ignoring
details and responding only to the amount of money) or an
attentive process involving consideration of both immediate
and delayed rewards and the practicality and desirability of
those rewards. We demonstrate that participants in positive
affect are more likely to prefer, and to generate positive
thoughts on, the larger delayed reward, but this tendency is
also contingent on the larger reward’s relative attractiveness
compared with the smaller, immediate reward. This effect
reflects mindful high-level thinking, not heuristic thinking
among people in positive affect. Studies 5 and 6 show the
intertemporal preference effects in another way, namely, by
examining participants’ valuation of products with time
delay.
STUDY 1: BEHAVIOR IDENTIFICATION
In Study 1, we assessed level of thinking using the BIF
(Vallacher and Wegner 1989), which was developed in the
context of action identification theory but is also used for
measuring the level of construal (e.g., Liberman and Trope
1998). according to action identification theory, any action
can be identified at either a low level (in terms of how the
action is performed) or a high level (in terms of why the
action is being performed, along with a primary goal), and
the level of identification is relative and sensitive to contex-
tual or situational cues. The theory suggests that people who
think at a high level are less impulsive and more persistent
when faced with competing goals than low-level thinkers
(Vallacher and Wegner 1987, 1989). Similarly, construal-
level theory (Trope and Liberman 2003) suggests that high-
level construal leads to greater self-control and a decreased
present bias (e.g., Fujita et al. 2006). On the basis of the lit-
erature suggesting that positive affect increases cognitive
flexibility (e.g., Isen 2007) and extends the scope of think-
ing (e.g., Fredrickson and Branigan 2005), we predict that
positive affect promotes integration of detail and thus fos-
ters the ability to conceptualize a situation at a higher level.
Method
Forty-one students (21 in the positive-affect condition) at
a large university participated in the experiment in exchange
for extra credit toward their course grade. Participants were
randomly assigned to either a positive- or a neutral-affect
condition. They were told that they would pretest a set of
pictures for future experiments and were then presented
with 14 either mildly positive (e.g., flowers, puppies, trees)
or neutral (e.g., chairs, windows) slides, which, as a set, had
been pretested to be different in affect but equivalent in
arousal. The slides were displayed on a computer, and each
image advanced automatically after exposure of six seconds.
After viewing the whole set, participants indicated, on eight
seven-point rating scales that asked about different feelings,
how the slides had made them feel. Three of the eight items
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were intended to assess positive affect (“positive– negative,”
“pleasant–unpleasant,” and “happy–sad”; a = .96), and we
subsequently combined them to create an index of positive
affect.
After finishing the affect-manipulation task, participants
completed Vallacher and Wegner’s (1989) BIF. It consists
of 26 items, each presenting a behavior paired with two
alternatives: a low-level and a high-level identification. For
example, “making a list” can be identified as either “getting
organized” (high level) or “writing things down” (low
level). Participants were asked to choose only one of the
two alternatives as the meaning of each behavior. The num-
ber of high-level identifications constituted a participant’s
BIF score.
Results
Compared with participants in the neutral-affect condi-
tion, those in the positive-affect condition reported that the
pictures made them feel more positive (Mpos = 1.43, Mneu =
3.05; t(39) = 7.15, p < .01). A t-test showed that the partici-
pants in the positive-affect condition more often identified
behaviors at a high level (M = 16.19, SD = 5.02) than did
participants in the neutral-affect condition (M = 12.85, SD =
4.02; t(39) = 2.35, p < .05).
STUDY 2: TIME PERSPECTIVE
Study 2 investigates level of thinking in terms of tempo-
ral perspective. This approach was based on two streams of
research, construal-level theory and socioemotional selec-
tivity theory (e.g., Carstensen 2006). The former suggests
that levels of construal are related to temporal perspective,
such that thinking of the distant future leads to high-level
construal, whereas thinking of the present or near future
leads to low-level construal. The latter, socioemotional
selectivity theory, indicates that perception of future time
plays an important role in motivation, influencing whether
people pursue long- or short-term goals. It suggests that
people with an expanded (vs. limited) time perspective are
more likely to consider the long-term consequences of their
choices rather than only the immediate consequences. We
propose that because positive affect enables people to con-
sider multiple factors—future as well as present matters—
they are more likely to be future oriented than those in neu-
tral affect. To converge experimentally on the construct of
high-level thinking, in Study 2, we used the future time per-
spective scale (Carstensen and Lang 1996) to examine the
possibility that people in positive affect are more likely to
take a future-oriented time perspective.
Method
Fifty students (26 in the positive-affect condition) partici-
pated in the experiment in exchange for extra credit toward
their course grade. We manipulated and confirmed affect the
same way as in Study 1. Following the affect manipulation
task and check, participants completed the future time per-
spective questionnaire. The questionnaire consists of ten
items (e.g., “I expect that I will set many new goals in the
future” [reverse coded], “As I get older I begin to experi-
ence time as limited”), anchored on 1 (“strongly agree”) and
7 (“strongly disagree”). We obtained a future time perspec-
tive score by averaging participants’ ratings on these items.
Results
As in Study 1, people in the positive-affect condition
reported that the slide set made them feel happier (Mpos =
1.41, Mneu = 3.40; t(68) = 8.61, p < .01). As we predicted,
people in positive affect reported a more future-oriented
time perspective (Mpos = 5.85, SD = .66; Mneu = 5.33, SD =
.73; t(68) = 2.68, p = .01). This further suggests that people
in positive affect are more likely to take future outcomes
into consideration.
STUDY 3: INSTANT VERSUS MAIL-IN REBATE Ι
Studies 1 and 2 indicate that positive affect, which has been
shown to increase cognitive flexibility, can foster forward-
looking, high-level thinking, which itself has been shown to
influence self-control. In the following studies, which
examine participants’ choices and evaluations, we directly
test the hypothesis that positive affect increases consumers’
willingness to wait for larger rewards and decreases present
bias. In Study 3, participants chose between an instant
rebate and a mail-in rebate, the latter of which provided a
larger amount of money later. We predicted that participants
in positive affect would be more likely to choose the mail-
in rebate than those in neutral affect when the difference in
amount to be gained was at least moderate and up to the
point at which the difference in amounts was so great that
almost everyone would opt for the larger amount.
Method
Ninety-five students (42 men and 4 unidentified) partici-
pated in the experiment in exchange for extra credit toward
their course grade. In this study, we manipulated affect
using words. Participants were told that they would com-
plete a set of unrelated short studies. They were then ran-
domly assigned to either a positive- or a neutral-affect con-
dition and began with a word task designed to carry out the
affect manipulation. Each participant was given a booklet
containing a set of ten positive (e.g., “music,” “fun”) or neu-
tral (e.g., “shelf,” “verb”) words that had been pretested to
induce affect and did not differ in other ways. Participants
were asked to read each one and write down the first word
that came to mind.
After completing the word task, participants received the
seemingly unrelated second study titled “Consumer Sur-
vey,” which involved a hypothetical purchase. They were
told that their favorite model DVD player was now avail-
able for the same price at two online stores, but with differ-
ent promotions, one with an instant rebate and the other
with a mail-in rebate. The mail-in rebate, the participants
were told, provided a greater amount of money than the
instant rebate but would take four to six weeks to be
received. Each participant made a choice between the two
rebates for five hypothetical choice sets. First, the partici-
pant chose between a $25 instant rebate and a $35 mail-in
rebate. After making the first choice, participants completed
the remaining four choice sets, which were on the next
page. In each, the amount of instant rebate stayed the same
($25), but the mail-in rebate was set to be $30, $40, $45, or
$50. This design enabled us to observe the pattern of rebate
choice over different sizes of rebate differentials.
Results
Manipulation checks. Two judges who were unaware of
the hypothesis and the participants’ experimental conditions
scored the positivity and unusualness of each word associ-
ate provided by participants (yes or no). Prior research has
shown that people in positive affect are more likely to pro-
duce more positive and more unusual word associations
than those in a neutral state (e.g., Isen et al. 1985), and
researchers have used such implicit measures previously as
manipulation checks (for a discussion, see Isen and Erez
2007). As we expected, participants in the positive-affect
condition obtained significantly higher positivity scores
(Mpos = 2.15, Mneu = .05; t(46.72) = 15.31, p < .001) and
unusualness scores (Mpos = .49, Mneu = .30; t(93) = 2.62, p =
.01) than controls.
Choice of mail-in rebate. We performed a chi-square
analysis for each of the five choice sets. When the mail-in
rebate was worth $35, the case in which we thought the
rebate difference ($10) would be moderate, there was a mar-
ginally significant difference between the affect conditions:
In the positive-affect condition, 54.3% of the participants
chose the mail-in rebate, and in the neutral-affect condition,
34.7% did (c2(1) = 3.72, p < .06).
When the mail-in rebate was worth $40 (a $15 differ-
ence), there was a significant difference between the affect
conditions. Specifically, those in the positive condition
showed a stronger preference (82.2%) for the mail-in rebate
than those in the neutral condition (60.4%; c2(1) = 5.36, p <
.05).
In contrast, when the mail-in rebate was worth $30 (i.e.,
when there was only a $5 rebate difference), a majority of
participants, including those in the positive-affect condition,
preferred the $25 instant rebate (80.9%) to the $30 mail-in
rebate (19.1%). In the positive-affect condition, 26.1% of
participants preferred the mail-in rebate, a marginally sig-
nificantly greater percentage than in the control group
(12.5%; c2(1) = 2.80, p < .10); nonetheless, it is clear that
when the difference in rebate amounts was only $5, the
majority (73.9%) of the positive-affect participants pre-
ferred the instant rebate, just as control participants did.
Only when the mail-in rebate amount was large enough did
the positive-affect group prefer the mail-in rebate.
As further demonstration of this point, a repeated-measures
logistic regression analysis that compared people’s choices
for the different choice sets within the positive-affect condi-
tion, showed a significant difference between the $5- and
the $15-differential sets (Wald c2(1) = 28.23, p < .001).
Thus, although overall positive affect increased the ten-
dency to defer gratification in favor of a larger payoff, peo-
ple in positive affect were significantly less likely to opt for
the mail-in rebate when the difference between mail-in and
instant rebates was only $5 than when it was $15 or more.
This difference shows that people in positive affect were
paying attention to the details of the situation, not choosing
thoughtlessly.
When the mail-in rebate was worth $45 and $50, most
participants chose it over the instant rebate. Within the affect
conditions, 97.8% and 100% of those in the positive-affect
condition and 87.5% and 91.8% of those in the neutral-
affect condition chose the mail-in rebate (for the $45 and
$50 mail-in rebates, respectively), and the differences
between affect conditions were not statistically significant.
Not surprisingly, overall, as the amount of the mail-in rebate
increased, preference for it (vs. the instant rebate) also
increased (see Figure 1).
When the mail-in rebate was worth $40, but not for other
values, the results also showed a significant gender differ-
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ence: Overall, female participants preferred the mail-in
rebate (85.1%) more than male participants did (57.1%)
(c2(1) = 8.59, p < .01). In general, the genders were evenly
balanced between the affect conditions (22 women and 21
men in the positive-affect condition and 25 women and 21
men in the neutral-affect condition; we excluded six cases
from this analysis because four people did not report gen-
der, and two people did not make a choice in the $40 choice
set). A logistic regression analysis on the rebate choice,
which we conducted to investigate the influence of affect
independent of that of gender, revealed that gender was a
significant predictor of the mail-in rebate choice (Wald =
8.62, p < .01) but that affect, by itself, was still a significant
predictor of the rebate choice (Wald = 4.33, p < .05): Posi-
tive affect still increased the odds of choosing the mail-in
rebate (vs. the instant rebate) by a factor of 3.02.
STUDY 4: INSTANT VERSUS MAIL-IN REBATE ΙΙ
The preceding studies demonstrate that positive affect
can foster high-level thinking and increase willingness to
wait for better, delayed rewards. Study 3 specifically sug-
gests that this choice pattern is not the result of a heuristic
process, such as simply following the larger amount. In
Study 4, we explore this aspect of the cognitive processes
underlying our findings in more detail—that is, whether
positive-affect participants’ increase in willingness to wait
is attributable to heuristic thinking or to flexible, systematic
thinking based on consideration of the costs and benefits of
waiting and what other processes may be involved.
In this study, we manipulated the amount of the mail-in
rebate between subjects, whereas we had manipulated it
within subjects in the previous study. Here, we focused on
two choice sets: one with a $30 mail-in rebate (vs. a $25
instant rebate), for which Study 3 indicated no difference in
rebate choice between the affect conditions, and the other
with a $40 mail-in rebate, for which Study 3 indicated a sig-
nificant difference between the affect conditions. Thus, in
Study 4, participants make a choice between a $25 instant
and a $30 mail-in rebate in one condition, and a $25 instant
and a $40 mail-in rebate in the other condition. If people in
positive affect always choose the larger amount, regardless
of the differential between the instant and the mail-in
rebates (i.e., use a heuristic process), they will choose the
mail-in rebate in both the $30 and the $40 conditions. How-
ever, we predict that because positive affect facilitates con-
sideration of both the costs and benefits of waiting, they will
choose the mail-in rebate more than controls only when the
difference is substantial ($40 condition) and not when it is
small ($30 condition).
We also added a thought-listing questionnaire to observe
whether participants’ choices are mediated by their thoughts.
If people in positive affect adopt a superficial, heuristic
process, they will generate fewer thoughts than controls
(because they are simply following a cue such as money,
and thus their choice does not involve much thought), or
they will generate more positive thoughts about the mail-in
rebate regardless of the differential between mail-in and
instant rebates. We predict that in positive affect, people’s
choice will be guided by their thinking about the trade-offs
between the two options, and thus they will have more posi-
tive thoughts than controls about the mail-in rebate when it
is moderately larger than the instant rebate but not when the
difference is minimal.
Alternatively, it can be argued that this willingness to
wait occurs because positive affect leads people to be more
optimistic, and thus to expect that the mail-in rebate will
take less time to arrive. In other words, people in positive
affect might underestimate the length of the waiting time
and thus be more willing to wait. To rule out this possibility,
we also asked participants how many weeks they thought it
would take to receive the mail-in rebate.
Last, we obtained a measure of the concreteness (vs.
abstractness) of the mental representation of the rebates,
because previous research has shown that concrete repre-
sentation of stimuli leads to less self-control (e.g., Malkoc
and Zauberman 2006; Trope and Liberman 2003). We did
this to determine whether positive affect changes the con-
creteness of the way options are perceived and whether this
change influences the ability to wait.
Method
One hundred seventeen college students took part in the
experiment. We manipulated and checked affect using words
the same way as in Study 3. After the affect-manipulation
task, participants were randomly assigned to either a $30 or
a $40 mail-in rebate condition, and each participant indi-
cated his or her choice between an instant rebate ($25) and
a mail-in rebate ($30 or $40, depending on condition) on a
choice-preference scale ranging from 1 (“certainly instant”)
to 9 (“certainly mail-in”) and also by a choice measure.
The rebate questionnaire was almost identical to that of
Study 3, except for the following: First, the question stated
that the mail-in rebate would take “a few weeks” to be
processed, whereas in Study 3 the waiting time had been
specified as “4 to 6 weeks.” Second, after participants made
their choices, we asked them what thoughts they had while
making the choice. The questionnaire was divided into three
sections—instant rebate, mail-in rebate, and other—and
participants listed their thoughts under the corresponding
category. After the thought-listing task, participants indi-
cated how concrete (vs. abstract) the instant rebate seemed
to them and how the mail-in rebate was mentally repre-
sented on scales ranging from 1 (“very abstract”) to 9 (“very
concrete”). They then estimated the number of weeks they
thought it would take to receive the rebate.
Results
Manipulation check. Our manipulation check results
were as expected. Participants in the positive-affect condi-
tion generated more positive (Mpos = 3.04, Mneu = .17;
t(69.77) = 23.04, p < .001) and unusual (Mpos = .27, Mneu =
.12; t(102.58) = 2.28, p < .05) word associations than those
in the neutral-affect condition.
Choice of mail-in rebate. As in Study 3, we performed a
chi-square analysis for each choice set. When the mail-in
rebate amount was $30 (i.e., only a $5 rebate difference),
the difference between the positive and neutral conditions
(25.8% vs. 40.7%) was not significant (c2(1) = 1.46, n.s.).
However, when the mail-in rebate was worth $40 (a $15 dif-
ference), the difference between the affect conditions was
significant. Specifically, participants in positive affect were
more likely to choose the mail-in rebate (78.6%) than those
in neutral affect (48.4%; c2(1) = 5.73, p < .05). Comparing
the mail-in rebate choice within each affect condition, we
find that for positive affect, but not for neutral, the percent-
age of people who chose the mail-in rebate was signifi-
cantly greater for the $40 condition than for the $30 condi-
tion (see Figure 2).
We also conducted a 2 (affect: positive vs. neutral) ¥ 2
(mail-in rebate amount: $30 vs. $40) between-subjects
analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the choice preference rat-
ing (1 = “certainly instant rebate,” and 9 = “certainly mail-
in rebate”). As in the chi-square analysis, the results showed
a significant interaction between affect and the mail-in
rebate amount (F(3, 113) = 5.78, p < .05): Positive-affect
people showed a stronger preference for the mail-in rebate
than controls in the $40 condition (Mpos = 6.57, SD = 2.66
vs. Mneu = 4.87, SD = 2.81; F(1, 113) = 5.19, p < .05) but
not in the $30 condition (Mpos = 3.23, SD = 2.85 vs. Mneu =
4.07, SD = 3.13; F(1, 113) = 1.27, n.s.). In other words, as
the benefit to waiting increased, the preference for the mail-
in rebate significantly increased in the positive-affect condi-
tion (M$30 = 3.23, M$40 = 6.57; F(1, 113) = 20.10, p < .001)
but not in the neutral-affect condition (M$30 = 4.07, M$40 =
4.87; F(1, 113) = 1.12, n.s.). A 2 (affect) ¥ 2 (mail-in rebate
amount) ¥ 2 (gender) ANOVA showed no significant effect
of gender or interaction that involved gender.
Thought listing about intertemporal options. A 2 (affect:
positive vs. neutral) ¥ 2 (mail-in rebate amount: $30 vs.
$40) ANOVA showed that there was no significant differ-
ence between the four conditions in the number of total
thoughts (Mpos-$30 = 6.16, Mpos-$40 = 6.54, Mneu-$30 = 5.89,
Mneu-$40 = 5.81; n.s.), or in the number of thoughts about
each type of rebate (Minstant = 2.56, Mmail-in = 3.19, Mother =
.37). We further coded thought listings for valence to deter-
mine whether affect condition and reward size interacted in
producing favorable thoughts about the mail-in rebate. We
conducted two 2 (affect: positive vs. neutral) ¥ 2 (mail-in
rebate amount: $30 vs. $40) ¥ 3 (valence of thoughts: posi-
tive vs. negative vs. neutral) mixed ANOVAs on the num-
ber of thoughts about the instant and mail-in rebates sepa-
rately, treating affect and rebate amount as between-subject
factors and thought valence as a within-subject factor. First,
regarding the instant rebate, there was only a main effect of
valence, such that people had more positive thoughts (e.g.,
“fast,” “easy”) than negative (e.g., “less money”) or neutral
thoughts (e.g., “Do I need money right now?”) (Mpositive =
1.92, Mnegative = .29, Mneutral = .34; F(2, 112) = 90.59, p <
.001). No other effects were significant.
However, for the mail-in rebate, there was a significant
three-way interaction of affect, rebate amount, and valence
of thoughts (F(2, 112) = 3.49, p < .05). Specifically, when
the mail-in rebate was $30, people had more negative
thoughts (M = 2.02; e.g., “waiting,” “takes longer”) than
positive (M = .60; e.g., “more money”) or neutral (M = .48;
e.g., “how many weeks?”) thoughts about it, and there were
no significant differences between the affect conditions. In
contrast, when the mail-in rebate was $40, the two affect
conditions diverged: People in positive affect listed as many
positive (M = 1.21, SD = .96) as negative thoughts about the
mail-in rebate (M = 1.50, SD = 1.14; n.s.) but more positive
thoughts than the neutral-affect people did (M = .45, SD =
.57; F(1, 113) = 14.17, p < .001). In contrast, participants in
neutral affect listed more negative (M = 1.87) than positive
(M = .45) thoughts about the mail-in rebate (F(2, 112) =
10.79, p < .001), as was true in the $30 condition. In other
words, for only those in positive affect, the number of posi-
tive thoughts about the mail-in rebate was greater when the
value of the mail-in rebate was $40 than when it was $30
(M$30 = .61, M$40 = 1.21; F(1, 113) = 8.81, p < .01). This
did not occur for participants in neutral affect (M$30 = .59,
M$40 = .45, n.s.; see Figure 3). The number of negative
thoughts did not differ between the two affect conditions.
The preceding analyses indicate that the number of posi-
tive thoughts on the delayed option may play a key role in
the effect of affect on intertemporal choice. Therefore, we
conducted a mediation analysis to determine whether posi-
tive thoughts about the mail-in rebate mediated the influ-
ence of positive affect on the choice preference in the $40
condition. We regressed participants’ choice preference rat-
ings on affect and the number of positive thoughts about the
mail-in rebate (POSMail). We found that affect (b = 1.70,
R2 = .09, p < .05) and POSMail (b = 1.87, R2 = .32, p <
.001) separately were significant predictors of participants’
choice preferences. Positive affect also significantly pre-
dicted the number of positive thoughts about the mail-in
rebate (b = .76, R2 = .20, p = .001). However, when we
entered affect and POSMail together as predictor variables
in the analysis, affect was no longer significant (b = .34, p =
.63), whereas POSMail was still a significant factor (b =
1.79, p <.001; Sobel test = 3.04, Z = 2.82, p < .01). This
finding indicates that the number of positive thoughts about
the mail-in rebates mediates the effects of positive affect on
perference for the delayed option.
Concreteness of representation of intertemporal options.
We conducted two 2 (affect: positive vs. neutral) ¥ 2 (mail-
in rebate amount: $30 vs. $40) ANOVAs separately: one on
the concreteness (vividness, temptingness) of the represen-
tation of the instant rebate and one for that of the mail-in
rebate. The analysis for the instant rebate revealed a signifi-
cant main effect of mail-in rebate amount, such that the
instant rebate was perceived as more concrete when it was
paired with a $30 mail-in rebate (M = 6.91, SD = 1.67) than
when with a $40 mail-in rebate (M = 5.88, SD = 2.19; F(1,
538 JournAl of MArkeTing reSeArch, June 2011
figure 2
STuDy 4: PercenTAge of MAil-in rebATe choice in
PoSiTive- AnD neuTrAl-AffecT conDiTionS, for $30-




























Mail-In Rebate Reward ($)
$30 $40a
Positive affect   neutral affect
ac2(1) = 5.73, p < .05.
increasing consumers’ Willingness to Wait 539
111) = 7.99, p < .01). In addition, there was a marginally
significant interaction between affect and mail-in rebate
amount (F(1, 111) = 3.16, p < .08). Specifically, positive-
affect people perceived the instant rebate as less concrete
when it was contrasted with a $30 mail-in rebate than a $40
rebate (M$30 = 7.34, M$40 = 5.68; p < .01), whereas we
observed no such difference among the neutral-affect par-
ticipants (M$30 = 6.44, M$40 = 6.06; n.s.). In contrast, for
the mail-in rebate, the concreteness of the representation did
not differ by condition. Furthermore, a mediation analysis
did not suggest that concreteness of the instant rebate medi-
ated the effect of positive affect on willingness to wait.
Estimated length of waiting time. A 2 (affect: positive vs.
neutral) ¥ 2 (rebate amount: $30 vs. $40) ANOVA revealed
that there was only a main effect of the rebate amount.
Although we did not anticipate this finding, the results
showed that people expected to receive the mail-in rebate
sooner when it was worth $40 (M = 4.00 weeks, SD = 1.02)
than when it was worth $30 (M = 4.44 weeks, SD = 1.21;
F(1, 113) = 4.22, p < .05). However, there was no signifi-
cant difference between the positive- and neutral-affect con-
ditions (Mpos = 4.28 weeks, SD = 1.27; Mneu = 4.15 weeks,
SD = .99; F(1, 113) = .29, n.s.), nor was the interaction sig-
nificant. Thus, there is no evidence that people in positive
affect underestimated the length of the waiting time com-
pared with controls.
Discussion
Studies 3 and 4, one using a within-subject design and
one using a between-subjects design, show that positive
affect, compared with controls, can foster delay of gratifica-
tion and increase willingness to wait for a better reward, but
only when the difference in rewards is substantial. We found
that the choices of neutral-affect participants differed in the
$30 and the $40 conditions of Study 3 (repeated measure)
but not in Study 4, in which participants made only one
choice (between-subjects design). That is, unless faced with
sequential choices, controls are relatively insensitive to the
desirability (amount) of the delayed option. In contrast, peo-
ple in the positive-affect condition distinguished between
the $30 and $40 rebate amounts in both studies.
Furthermore, Study 4 investigates the processes under-
lying the influence of positive affect on ability to wait. The
thought-listing measure shows that positive affect increases
the number of positive thoughts about the future option
when it is perceived to be sufficiently valuable. In addition,
the mediation analysis reveals that these thoughts mediate
the effect of positive affect on preference for the delayed
option. Figure 3 further demonstrates that, in the $40 condi-
tion, people in positive affect had a more balanced view
about the delayed options: They were aware of negative
(e.g., waiting time) as well as positive (e.g., money) aspects
of waiting.
Because positive thoughts increased as the desirability of
the delayed option increased and participants in positive
affect were more likely to choose to wait only in the $40
condition, we suggest that the way positive-affect people
engage in forward-looking, high-level thinking is flexible
and mindful rather than superficial or heuristic (i.e., relying
on a simple cue, such as choosing the larger rebate every
time). If the latter were the case, the positive-affect people
would have chosen the mail-in rebate in every choice set,
regardless of the size of the difference between the mail-in
and instant rebates.
In addition, Study 4 provides no evidence that the reason
positive-affect people are more willing to wait is that they
underestimate the amount of time it will take to receive the
mail-in rebate. There was no difference between positive
and neutral affect in estimated waiting time. However, over-
all, people expected the waiting time to be shorter for the
larger mail-in rebate ($40). Thus, the desirability of a future
option seems to influence people’s estimated waiting time.
This can be investigated in further research.
The analysis of the perceived concreteness of the instant
rebate demonstrates that under conditions of positive affect,
the concreteness (temptingness) of the instant option is mal-
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leable and depends on the comparable delayed option: Peo-
ple in positive affect, but not controls, perceived a $25
instant rebate as more concrete (tempting) when compared
with a $30 mail-in rebate than when compared with a $40
rebate. However, this cognitive representation of concrete-
ness did not mediate the effect of positive affect on willing-
ness to wait: It was the positivity of the thoughts about the
future reward that changed positive-affect people’s choices.
Thus, willingness to wait is determined not by the attrac-
tiveness of the immediate or delayed option in an absolute
sense but rather by the relative difference between the
immediate and delayed options and, importantly, the posi-
tive thoughts about the sufficiently valuable delayed option
rather than the temptingness of the immediate.
STUDY 5: WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR IMMEDIATE
VERSUS DELAYED OUTCOMES
As we noted previously, in general, a person’s preference
for a positive outcome decreases if that outcome is to occur
in the distant future. Studies 5 and 6 examine these kinds of
present bias in a consumer context. In Study 5, we measured
participants’ preference for a delayed or an immediate prod-
uct by examining their willingness to pay, given receipt of
the product with different delay times. We expected that,
overall, participants would show a stronger preference for
an immediate product over a delayed one, as the previous
research has shown, but that because people in positive
affect consider the future situation as well as the present,
their willingness to pay for the product would not decrease
as much with time delay.
Method
Forty-four students (21 in the positive-affect condition)
participated in the experiment in exchange for extra credit
toward their course grade. We manipulated and confirmed
positive or neutral affect using pictures as we did in Study
1. Participants then read a product description (movie
passes; Fujita et al. 2006). They were asked to imagine pur-
chasing four movie passes (that would not expire) to a local
theater and to indicate how much they would pay for the
product if they were to receive it immediately and, follow-
ing that, if they were to receive it one month later.
Results
Participants in the positive-affect condition reported that
the pictures made them feel happier (Mpos = 1.38, Mneu =
3.54; t(36.72) = 10.18, p < .01). We conducted a 2 (affect:
positive vs. neutral) ¥ 2 (time: immediate vs. delayed)
mixed ANOVA on willingness to pay, treating time as a
repeated factor. The analysis revealed a significant main
effect of time, such that people were willing to pay more for
the product when it was to be delivered immediately (M =
24.69, SD = 9.78) than after a delay (M = 18.33, SD = 8.96;
F(1, 42) = 63.42, p < .001). More importantly, there was
also a significant interaction of time and affect. The differ-
ence in willingness to pay for the immediate versus the
delayed products was smaller in the positive-affect condi-
tion (Mimmed = 23.40, SD = 10.72; Mdelay = 18.73, SD =
10.86; difference = 4.67) than in the neutral condition
(Mimmed = 25.87, SD = 8.91; Mdelay = 17.96, SD = 7.01; dif-
ference = 7.91; F(1, 42) = 4.22, p < .05; see Figure 4). Thus,
as we predicted, positive affect led to a decreased level of
discounting over time, less of a decline in the perceived
value of a nonperishable product. Contrast tests comparing
positive and neutral affect within the immediate and the
delayed conditions were not significant, suggesting no
effect of positive affect on valuation (willingness to pay) of
the product in general.
STUDY 6: EXPEDITING SHORT VERSUS LONG
DELAYS
Like Study 5, Study 6 tests the hypothesis that positive
affect reduces present-biased preferences but uses a differ-
ent, convergent, method. In this study, we measured present-
biased preference as Malkoc and Zauberman (2006) did: by
examining the amount people would be willing to pay to
expedite the product delivery by three (short delay) and ten
(long delay) days. We predicted that, as the literature has
shown, overall, participants would be willing to pay a
higher daily premium to expedite a short delay than a long
delay (hyperbolic discounting) but that positive affect
would decrease this discounting (the discounting slope
would be less steep).
Method
Participants. Fifty students participated in the experiment
in exchange for extra credit. Four people in each of the
affect conditions did not follow instructions (they declined
to expedite delivery), and one participant was acquainted
with the experimenter. We dropped the data for those nine
people from the analysis.
Procedure. We manipulated and checked affect the same
way as in Study 1. Participants were presented with a sce-
nario asking them to imagine buying a digital camera. They
were told that the delivery of their product was scheduled
for a future date and were asked how much more they would
pay to expedite the delivery by three, and then by ten, days.
Results
Participants in the positive-affect condition reported that
the pictures made them feel happier than did controls (Mpos =
1.50, Mneu = 3.44; t(34.48) = 8.99, p < .001). We calculated
daily premiums for expediting delivery by dividing the total
willingness to pay by the number of days of expediting
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(three or ten). A 2 (affect: positive vs. neutral) ¥ 2 (time
horizon: three days vs. ten days) mixed ANOVA on daily
premiums, treating time horizon as a repeated factor,
revealed a main effect of time horizon, indicating that par-
ticipants placed a higher daily premium on expediting the
three-day delay (M = 2.60, SD = 1.88) than the ten-day
delay (M = 1.40, SD = 0.84; F(1, 39) = 18.28, p <.001). In
addition, there was a marginally significant main effect of
affect (F(1, 39) = 2.96, p = .09) and, more importantly, as
we predicted, a significant interaction between affect and
time horizon (F(1, 39) = 4.45, p < .05). Specifically, in the
positive-affect condition, decline of daily willingness-to-pay
premiums over the time horizon was less sharp (M3days =
2.00, SD = 1.36; M10days =1.40, SD = .86; F(1, 39) = 2.29, 
p = .14, n.s.) than among controls (M3days = 3.17, SD =
2.15; M10days = 1.40, SD = .83; F(1, 39) = 20.90, p < .001;
see Figure 5). Contrasts showed that participants in neutral
affect were willing to pay significantly more per day to
expedite the short delay (three days) than were those in
positive affect (Mneu = 3.17, Mpos = 2.00; F(1, 39) = 4.32, p <
.05). There was no significant difference for expediting the
long delay (ten days) (Mneu = 1.40 and Mpos = 1.40). Thus,
as we predicted, present bias was less in the positive-affect
condition.
A scatterplot of daily premiums (see Figure 6) further
demonstrates the relationship between present-biased dis-
counting and affect. In the positive-affect condition, but not
in the control condition, there was a positive relationship
between participants’ daily premium for the three-day delay
and their daily premium for the ten-day delay. In other
words, those in the positive-affect condition tended to esti-
mate daily premiums for ten days proportionally according
to their daily premiums for three days, whereas those in the
neutral-affect condition disproportionately estimated daily
premiums for ten days, without regard to the daily premium
for three days.
Discussion
Studies 5 and 6 investigate people’s intertemporal prefer-
ences by examining their present-biased discounting of a
desired product over time. In Study 5, in the positive-affect
condition, participants’ willingness to pay for a product was
not decreased as much by having to wait for the product as
it was in the neutral condition. The product (movie passes)
was not perishable and retained its full actual value over
time. It is possible that for some types of products, particu-
larly those that lose value with time, people in positive
affect might instead show a reduction in value. This remains
to be investigated.
Using another measure, Study 6 shows that people in
positive affect were willing to wait for a valued product, in
that they allocated less than controls to expedite its delivery.
They also continued to value the product equally regardless
of whether the delay was three or ten days, because they
showed the same level of daily premiums from the shorter
to the longer time horizon. That is, they maintained interest
in obtaining the product regardless of whether a long or
short delay was involved. In contrast, people in the neutral-
affect condition emphasized the short-term delay and lost
interest in the product if a long delay was involved.
As Figure 6 shows, the affect conditions differ in per-
ceived relationship between present and future outcomes.
People in positive affect consider the long-term option in
the context of the short-term option, suggesting that they
perceive present and future options as interrelated, whereas
those in neutral affect view intertemporal options as rela-
tively distinct. This finding is compatible with those of pre-
vious research, suggesting that positive affect helps people
see how present situations are functionally linked to future
figure 5
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outcomes (e.g., Aspinwall 2005; Erez and Isen 2002; Taylor
et al. 1998).
The results of Studies 5 and 6 together show that our
findings are attributable to present-biased preferences and
willingness to wait, not to lessened willingness to pay or
concern with money in general. This is because in the two
studies, the measures that showed greater willingness to
wait among people in positive affect involved both greater
willingness to pay in one instance (Study 5: valuation of the
delayed object) and less willingness to pay in the other
(Study 6: expediting delivery).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The current research examines the influence of positive
affect on flexible, forward-looking, high-level thinking in
the context of intertemporal choice phenomena. Specifi-
cally, the studies examined the influence of positive affect
on consumers’ willingness to wait for a better option that is
available and on their level of overvaluing the present (pre-
sent bias), as indicated by valuation and discounting rates
for a desired product. Furthermore, this work examines the
cognitive processes underlying this kind of self-control and
valuation of material benefits.
Studies 1 and 2 show that positive affect can increase the
level of thinking, which we measured with both the BIF and
the time perspective scale. Studies 3 and 4 demonstrate that
people in positive affect are more likely than comparable
controls to wait to get a larger rebate when the difference
between the immediate and delayed rebate is moderately
large. (When the difference is small, people in positive
affect do not differ from controls in willingness to wait.) In
addition, the studies reveal that this occurs because positive
affect enables people to consider more positive aspects of
the delayed option, whereas in neutral affect, people tend to
focus on the instant option without regard for the desirabil-
ity of the delayed option. Studies 5 and 6 examine the influ-
ence of positive affect on intertemporal preferences, using
additional measures. The results show that people in posi-
tive affect, compared with controls, reported less devalua-
tion of a product that would be delayed (Study 5) and also
less willingness to pay to receive the product immediately
(Study 6). Thus, as indicated by converging measures, for
people in mild positive affect, the immediate reward seems
relatively less tempting when there is a better option in the
future, and when they have more positive thoughts about
that future option, they are more patient and able to wait.
Furthermore, these studies demonstrate the influence of
positive affect on the cognitive representation of intertem-
poral outcomes. For example, the scatterplot of daily pre-
mium by affect and time horizon (Figure 6) suggests that
people in positive affect are more likely to perceive out-
comes that will occur at different points in time as interre-
lated rather than as independent. That is, they are more
likely to see and value future outcomes in the context of
present outcomes.
These findings are compatible with the previous research
suggesting that positive affect leads to more mindful think-
ing and deployment of attention, which enable people to
consider and integrate more factors and aspects of situations
(e.g., Erez and Isen 2002; Fredrickson and Branigan 2005;
Isen 2007; Johnson and Fredrickson 2005). People in posi-
tive affect may see more aspects of both present and future
outcomes, ultimately enabling them to understand the conti-
nuity between them and consider the trade-offs. Thus, this
flexibility may enable people to wait for larger rewards and
to exert self-control in other ways as well.
Note that although the current work demonstrates that
positive affect can foster high-level thinking in the domain
of self-control, the concept of high-level thinking does not
imply superficial thinking or inability to focus on details of
the context. Rather, the evidence suggests that the forward-
looking, high-level thinking promoted by positive affect is
characterized by comprehensive integration of both situational
factors and the person’s goals or concerns: People in posi-
tive affect take the specifics of the task or situation into
account in construing an object or a behavior and deciding
about it.
For example, consider that in Studies 3 and 4, the size of
the rebate difference influenced the effect of positive affect
on willingness to wait, such that positive-affect people
chose to wait only when the difference between the instant
and mail-in rebates was moderately large. This shows that
they considered both time and money and made trade-offs
rather than just choosing the larger rebate. Likewise, in
Studies 5 and 6, if people in positive affect were deciding
superficially, there should have been only main effects of
affect rather than interactions between affect and time hori-
zon. These findings have important implications for under-
standing the effects of positive affect more generally
because they add to the literature showing that positive
affect does not impair systematic, careful processing but
rather facilitates it (e.g., Erez and Isen 2002; Nadler, Rabi,
and Minda 2010; Staw and Barsade 1993).
Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez (1989) convincingly
demonstrate that the ability to delay gratification is associ-
ated with success in many spheres of life, even years after
the initial observation of delay behavior, and they also show
that this ability can be influenced by cognitive and situa-
tional interventions. The current work, then, contributes to
the growing body of research indicating that positive affect
also facilitates the ability to delay gratification and wait for
better rewards, contributing an important source of strength
and benefit in peoples’ lives.
The current research has significant implications for
managers and consumer researchers as well. For example,
according to this work, it seems that inducing positive affect
may lead consumers to be more likely to join consumer
reward programs (e.g., stamp cards, mileage programs)
because such programs depend on people’s understanding
that rewards increase over time and that the future soon
becomes the present. Those who join consumer reward pro-
grams may develop a strong relationship with the firm,
which will increase their customer lifetime value to the
firm. Because, as we demonstrate, mild positive affect leads
people to appreciate the promise of larger benefits later and
to be more willing to wait for those benefits, marketers may
want to combine positive-affect inductions with consumer
reward programs. It is important to note that the positive-
affect inductions used in this stream of research typically
include small gifts or free samples, coupons, and the like, in
addition to factors such as environmental influences, pleas-
ant pictures and décor, and so on. These are small, everyday
interventions that are easily under companies’ and mar-
keters’ control.
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In addition, the findings of the current studies suggest
interesting possibilities regarding financial instruments and
products, and factors that may help consumers of those
products put their investments into perspective. Not only
might marketers of high-quality investment or credit
options be better able to present their products to consumers
who are in a mildly positive state, but the affective state
may also help the consumer understand the benefits to be
had in investments that will pay well in the future. Thus, the
current research suggests important directions for further
research in both theoretical and applied domains.
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